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  • 1
    Article
    Article
    2014
    ISSN: 1793-9690 
    Language: English
    In: China Economic Policy Review, June 2014, Vol.3(1)
    Subject(s): Chinese Unions ; Union Strategy ; Labor Disputes ; Strikes Arbitration ; Economics
    ISSN: 1793-9690
    E-ISSN: 1793-9704
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  • 2
    Article
    Article
    2014
    ISSN: 0217-5908 
    Language: English
    In: The Singapore Economic Review, 09/2014, Vol.59(04), p.1401002
    Description: No abstract received.
    Subject(s): Economics;
    ISSN: 0217-5908
    E-ISSN: 1793-6837
    Source: CrossRef
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  • 3
    Article
    Article
    2014
    ISSN: 0217-5908 
    Language: English
    In: The Singapore Economic Review, September 2014, Vol.59(4)
    Subject(s): Economics
    ISSN: 0217-5908
    E-ISSN: 1793-6837
    Source: World Scientific Publishing Co.
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  • 4
    Article
    Article
    2014
    ISSN: 0217-5908 
    Language: English
    In: The Singapore Economic Review, September 2014, Vol.59(4)
    Description: Trade unions may exact a heavy cost on an economy, but there is one mode of trade unionism that will enable the trade union to play a positive role in economic development. This mode of unionism, which may be characterized as macro-focused, requires the trade union to work closely with the ruling party in order to contribute to economic development. The required symbiosis between such a trade union and the ruling party may not be sustainable when there is a change in government. This paper argues that a union can remain macro-focused as long as it is not part of any political party and therefore can work with any government regardless of which political party is in power. The paper will examine the various conditions, both economic and non-economic, under which such an outcome can exist and be sustainable. The paper will also analyze how a macro-focused union induces workers to join the union based on the results of a field survey of 690 respondents in Singapore.
    Subject(s): Strategic Collective Bargaining ; Union Social Responsibility ; Macro-Focused Union ; Economics
    ISSN: 0217-5908
    E-ISSN: 1793-6837
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  • 5
    Article
    Article
    2014
    ISSN: 0217-5908 
    Language: English
    In: The Singapore Economic Review, 09/2014, Vol.59(04), p.1450036
    Description: To access, purchase, authenticate, or subscribe to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0217590814500362 Byline: SHUNTIAN YAO, SOON BENG CHEW This paper investigates the roles played by a macro-focused union in the stabilization of the employment level and wages during periods of demand shocks. A macro focused union sets the wage at the level which maximizes employment and provides union benefits to union members to counter free ridership. We set up a solid micro-foundation to derive the industry labor demands in normal periods and in periods with shocks. We argue that the roles played by the macro focused union lead to a more stable employment level which is beneficial to both the employers and employees.
    Subject(s): Labor Unions – Models;
    ISSN: 0217-5908
    E-ISSN: 1793-6837
    Source: CrossRef
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  • 6
    Article
    Article
    2014
    ISSN: 0217-5908 
    Language: English
    In: The Singapore Economic Review, September 2014, Vol.59(4)
    Description: This paper investigates the roles played by a macro-focused union in the stabilization of the employment level and wages during periods of demand shocks. A macro focused union sets the wage at the level which maximizes employment and provides union benefits to union members to counter free ridership. We set up a solid micro-foundation to derive the industry labor demands in normal periods and in periods with shocks. We argue that the roles played by the macro focused union lead to a more stable employment level which is beneficial to both the employers and employees.
    Subject(s): Labor Demand ; Labor Supply ; Cooperative Bargaining ; Shifts of the Labor Demand Curve ; Economics
    ISSN: 0217-5908
    E-ISSN: 1793-6837
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  • 7
    Language: English
    In: The Singapore Economic Review, 06/2016, Vol.61(03), p.1640019
    Description: To access, purchase, authenticate, or subscribe to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0217590816400191 Traditional unions rely on collective bargaining benefits to attract workers to the union. A key ingredient of collective bargaining benefits is union wage premium which will force employers to retrench some workers. A macro-focused union differs from traditional union or micro-focused union in two ways. First, a macro-focused union will work together with the government and management to raise productivity and therefore shift the demand for labor curve upward. Second, the macro-focused union will want to maximize employment and therefore aim at competitive wage level for not only its members but non-union members too. Consequently, this may create a huge free ridership problem as workers may refuse to pay the member fee but still enjoy the club benefits. This paper focuses on a situation where a macro-focused labor union offers non-collective bargaining benefits through offering discount to a subset of consumption goods. However, individual workersa preference is not publicly observed. The union leader may pay a certain survey fee to find out. Therefore, in the equilibrium, the union leader needs to weigh the benefits of larger union size against the costs of survey fee. Similarly, on the workersa side, the tradeoff is the union member fee together with some psychology cost of being a union member against a discount on his favorable consumption goods. We develop a mathematical framework that incorporates all these elements above. We show both theoretically and quantitatively what determines the equilibrium union size and union leaderas survey decisions. Moreover, we also examine at the aggregate level, how the union workersa and union leaderas welfare levels may respond to certain changes in economic fundamentals, such as preference shift and changes in survey fee, etc.
    Subject(s): Collective Bargaining – Analysis ; Cost Benefit Analysis – Analysis ; Labor Unions – Analysis;
    ISSN: 0217-5908
    E-ISSN: 1793-6837
    Source: CrossRef
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  • 8
    Language: English
    In: The Singapore Economic Review, June 2016, Vol.61(3)
    Description: Traditional unions rely on collective bargaining benefits to attract workers to the union. A key ingredient of collective bargaining benefits is union wage premium which will force employers to retrench some workers. A macro-focused union differs from traditional union or micro-focused union in two ways. First, a macro-focused union will work together with the government and management to raise productivity and therefore shift the demand for labor curve upward. Second, the macro-focused union will want to maximize employment and therefore aim at competitive wage level for not only its members but non-union members too. Consequently, this may create a huge free ridership problem as workers may refuse to pay the member fee but still enjoy the club benefits. This paper focuses on a situation where a macro-focused labor union offers non-collective bargaining benefits through offering discount to a subset of consumption goods. However, individual workers’ preference is not publicly observed. The union leader may pay a certain survey fee to find out. Therefore, in the equilibrium, the union leader needs to weigh the benefits of larger union size against the costs of survey fee. Similarly, on the workers’ side, the tradeoff is the union member fee together with some psychology cost of being a union member against a discount on his favorable consumption goods. We develop a mathematical framework that incorporates all these elements above. We show both theoretically and quantitatively what determines the equilibrium union size and union leader’s survey decisions. Moreover, we also examine at the aggregate level, how the union workers’ and union leader’s welfare levels may respond to certain changes in economic fundamentals, such as preference shift and changes in survey fee, etc.
    Subject(s): Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Macro-Focused Union ; Quantitative Equilibrium ; Economics
    ISSN: 0217-5908
    E-ISSN: 1793-6837
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  • 9
    Lexicon Article
    Lexicon Article
    2012
    ISSN: 0217-4472 
    In: ASEAN economic bulletin, 2012, Vol.29(3), p.218
    Subject(s): Soziale Sicherheit
    ISSN: 0217-4472
    Source: wiso Wirtschaftswissenschaften (GBI-Genios Deutsche Wirtschaftsdatenbank GmbH) 〈img src="http://exlibris-pub.s3.amazonaws.com/wiso_logo.jpg" style="vertical-align:middle;margin-left:7px"〉
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  • 10
    Lexicon Article
    Lexicon Article
    2016
    ISSN: 0217-5908 
    In: The Singapore economic review, 2016, Vol.61(3), p.1
    ISSN: 0217-5908
    Source: wiso Wirtschaftswissenschaften (GBI-Genios Deutsche Wirtschaftsdatenbank GmbH) 〈img src="http://exlibris-pub.s3.amazonaws.com/wiso_logo.jpg" style="vertical-align:middle;margin-left:7px"〉
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